COUNSEL FEES FOR DISCOVERY AND
RECOVERY OF SHORT-SWING PROFITS
Under present law counsel fees are recoverablejbr services
instrumental in the enfbrcenent of section 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. While vital to the eJj'ctive
eni'breement of section 16(b), such fees tend to encourage
overzealous investigation by shareholders' attorneys which
often approaches unethical conduct. Recent decisions have
attempted both to encourage enjbrcemnent and discourage
unflvorable conduct. This note analyzes current case law in an
attempt to determine whether it has so succeeded, and suggests
an alternative which may provide ejjeetive enjbrcement of
section 16(b) and Yet avoid the ethical dilemma.

Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 seeks to
check the unfair use of inside information by corporate officers,
directors, and large shareholders to produce short-swing profits,
by authorizing the issuer or any owner of any security of the issuer
to bring suit to recover such profits.' It is uniformly agreed that the
opportunity to recover counsel fees in such a suit is a major
stimulus to the enforcement of 16(b). 2 However, the present
statutory scheme tends to promote unethical conduct approaching
'15 U.S.C. §§ 78p(a) & (b) (1964): "'Every person who is directly or indirectly the
beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any class of any equity security ... registered
.. " on a national securities exchange, or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of
such a security who makes any profit "from any purchase and sale, or any sale and
purchase. of any equity security of such issuer . . . within any period of less than six
months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously
contracted," shall be subject to the right of the issuer to recover such profit irrespective of
the motive or intent of the beneficial owner, director or officer. "Suit to recover such profit
may be instituted ... by the issuer or by the owner of any security of the issuer ... in
behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after
request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter;, but no such suit shall be
brought more than two years after the date such profit was realized." See generally 2 L.
Loss. SECURITIEs REGULATioN' 1037, 1051-55 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]; Cook
& Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities and Exchange Act. 66 HARV. L. REv. 385,
421-22 (1953); Comment, Insider Trading: The Issuer's Disposition of an Alleged 16(b)
Violation. 1968 DUKE L.J. 94. i02-08; 64 COLU.%. L. REv. 1343 (1964).
1-See. e.g.. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.. 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943); Magida v.
Continental Can Co., 176 F. Supp. 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); 2 Loss at 1042, 1051-55; 64
COL-ii. L. REv. 1343, 1344 (1964); 69 HARv. L. REv. 1146 (1956). Under section 16(a) all
beneficial owners are required to file within ten days after the close of any calendar month
during which there has been a change in their beneficial ownership of the issuer's stock. See
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champerty3 since it encourages members of the disinterested public
to become involved in corporate litigation for profit. In addition,
the decisions rendered to curb such practices have endangered the
future effectiveness of 16(b) enforcement by creating great delay in
the recovery of short-swing profits while failing to specify the
standard for recovery of counsel feesA It is submitted that these
undesirable consequences could be substantially avoided through a
simple statutory revision.

At common law counsel fees are recoverable in several instances
after a derivative suit has been brought by a shareholder, on behalf
of the other shareholders and the corporation, to redress a wrong
done to the corporation As a rule, if a plaintiff-shareholder's suit
is successful in protecting or augmenting corporate property,

counsel fees are recoverable from that property since a pecuniary
benefit has been rendered to the corporation Furthermore, even if
a successful judgment is not obtained, recovery of fees will generally
follow a showing that through the efforts of counsel some benefit

inured to the shareholder class. If, after the plaintiff-shareholder
files suit, a settlement is procured either by the corporation or

plaintiff, often plaintiff is entitled .to reimbursement for attorney's
fees. Similarly, if remedial action taken by the corporation or
15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964). Such records are available to the public and serve as the major
method by which attorneys discovery 16(b) violations.
-See Magida v. Continental Can Co., 176 F. Supp. 781, 782-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); 2 Loss
at 1052-53; 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1343, 1345 (1964); 1968 DuKE L.J.. supra note I, at 104; 69
HARV. L. REv. 1146 (1956). Champerty consists of an agreement whereby a person without
an interest in another's suit undertakes to carry it on at his own expense in consideration of
receiving in the event of success a part of the proceeds of the litigation. See. e.g.. Wilhoit's
Adm'x. v. Richardson, 193 Ky. 559, 236 S.W. 1025 (1921).
1See. e.g.. Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 F.2d 469, 473 (2d Cir. 1968); Gilson v.
Chock Full 0' Nuts Corp., 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964). See notes 25-27 supra and
accompanying text.
I See. e.g., Klopstock v. Superior Ct., 17 Cal. 2d 13, 108 P.2d 906 (194 1).
'See. e.g.. Hutchison Box Board & Paper Co. v. Van Horn, 299 F. 424 (8th Cir. 1924);
Vigran v. Hamilton. 321 Iii. App. 541, 53 N.E.2d 250 (1944); Martin Foundation, Inc. v.
Phillips-Jones Corp., 283 App. Div. 729, 127 N.Y.S.2d 649, affd, 306 N.Y. 972, 120 N.E.2d
230 (1954). In Eriksson v. Boyum, 150 Minn. 192, 184 N.W. 961 (1921) the court stated
that when an action brought on behalf of the corporation is successful the court may make
the attorney's fees a charge against the corporation, but if the action results in failure, he
who volunteers his services is alone responsible for the cost and expense incurred. See Angoff
v. Goldfine. 270 F.2d 185. 188-89 (Ist Cir. 1969), for factors to be weighed in the federal
courts to determine the figure for counsel fees.
- Pergamet v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 224 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1955). See. e.g.. Blau v. Allen,
171 F. Supp.. 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (40r, of the recovery as counsel fees was exorbitant in
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individual defendants is attributable to the initiation of suit, counsel

fees may also be awarded.s There are at least two situations,
however, where the attorney is considered a "mere volunteer" at
common law and has no right to reimbursement: wherq he is
merely doing investigatory work pursuant to an agreement with an
attorney of record and is not representing a potential plaintiff,9 and
where he merely discovers a claim but no suit is ever filed by
anyone other than the corporation."'

Although a 16(b) shareholder suit is not a common law
derivative action because its purpose is to recover a penalty payable
to the corporation rather than a fund belonging to it, courts have
held that in certain circumstances following a 16(b) violation a
derivative right to recover counsel fees is created for the benefit of
parties who prosecute or help to prosecute the violation." Such
counsel fee recoveries are, according to judicial authority, in the
public interest because they encourage policing of short-swing
insider's profits-the primary purpose of section 16 of the
Exchange Act. 2 Furthermore, just as in a shareholder's derivative
absence or a detailed showing of services. but reasonable fees were to be permitted); Goodwin
v. Castleton, 19 Wash. 2d 748, 144 P.2d 725 (1944) (although application for fees was
premature, fees would be permitted upon a showing that the corporation had benefited). See
also Comment, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits. 39 COLUM. L. REv. 784,
804-08 (1939).
SSee, e.g., Dottenheim v. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co., 77 F. Supp. 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1948);
KauFman v. Shoenberg, 33 Del. Ch. 282, 92 A.2d 295 (1952). See also Comment, The
Counsel Fee in Stockholder'sDerivativeSuits. 39 COLU. L. REv. 784, 798-804 (1939).
'Ripley v. Int'l Ry. of Cent. Am., 16 App. Div. 2d 260, 227 N.Y.S.2d 64, ajfd. 12
N.Y.2d 814, 236 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1962); Waterman Corp. v. Johnston, 122 N.Y.S.2d 695, 701
(Sup. Ct. 1953).
11But see Kaufman v. Shoenberg, 33 Del. Ch. 282, 92 A.2d 295 (1952). The court, citing
60 HARv. L. REv. 835 (1947). argued that a stockholder should be entitled to reasonable
investigation fees if a demand for action made to the corporation by the shareholder is first
refused by the company. However, the Harvard note based its reasoning on a section 16(b)
case, Dottenheim v. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co., 77 F. Supp. 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1948). Thus,
Kaufnan could not be utilized to extend its holding to section 16(b) suits in general. See
generally Comment, The Counsel Fee in Stockholders Derivative Suits. 39 COLU.L L. REV.
784 (1939).
"See. eag.. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1943). See 2 Loss at
1052; 60 HARv. L. Rev. 835 (1947). It is interesting to note that courts have reached this
conclusion in spite of the fact that whereas sections 9(e) and 18(a) of the act expressly provide
for the recovery oF counsel fees, 16(b) does not; and the implication would seem to be that
Congress did not intend counsel fees to be recoverable under 16(b). 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e) &
78r(a) (1964).
'-A federal district court has indicated that 16(b) suits must be encouraged to protect
public welfare. Magida v. Continental Can Co, 176 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). Further,
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suit, a 16(b) plaintiff, or potential plaintiff, moves to benefit the
entire class of shareholders and should thus have a similar right to
recover the expenses incurred. The fact that 16(b) judgments are
penalties rather than recoveries of assets formerly belonging to the
corporation13 does not weaken the argument for recovery of counsel
fees, because the. fees are deducted in either case from assets
rightfully belonging to the corporation.
There are times, however, when the analogy between common
law derivative and 16(b) suits becomes strained. In particular, the
strain arises from the statutory requirement that upon discovery of
a 16(b) violation a potential plaintiff must give the corporation
notice and then wait for sixty days before initiating his individual
action. He may thus incur expense prior to the time when he can
file suit, and the corporation may bring suit or settle during this
sixty-day period," or settle the claim even after he files. Where the
corporation settles after an individual 16(b) plaintiff files, there is
little problem: counsel fees are recoverable just as in a common law
derivative action, but with the restriction that the reasonableness of
the fee may be reviewed on appeal." Where the corporation settles
or files suit during the sixty-day period, however, the analogy to
recovery of fees for attempted prosecution of a derivative action
breaks down. Nevertheless, courts have declined to adopt a general
rule refusing recovery, 6 reasoning that the interest of the attorney
the requirement that a 16(b) plaintiff must have been a shareholder at the time of the

violation has been abrogated to encourage outside enforcement. Blau v. Mission Corp., 212
F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir.). ceri. denied. 347 U.S. 1016 (1954). and courts have refused to allow

defendants to attack the motives of plaintiff-shareholders' attorneys. See. e.g.. Pellegrino v.
Nesbit, 203 F.2d 463, 466 (9th Cir. 1953); Craftsman Fin. & Mortgage Co. v. Brown, 64 F.
Supp. 168. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); see also 2 Loss at 1052-53. One court even declined to

entertain a claim of champerty where an attorney had initiated the agreement to bring an
action and had financed the suit. Magida v. Continental Can Co., supra; 64 COLu.I. L. RFfv.
1343 (1964).
'-See Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc.. 389 F.2d 469, 474 (2d Cir. 1968).
* See note I supra.
* The courts must grant leave for and approve any private settlement subsequent to the
filing of suit. istel v. Christman, 133 F. Supp. 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). In Fistel the court
refused to permit settlement on the ground that no benefit would inure to the corporation
from the proposed settlement, as plaintiff had sought to recover fees from defendants in
return for dropping prosecution without making any provision for repayment of the profits
to the corporation. Such settlement, the court said, would be contrary to the purpose of the
statute. See Blau v. Allen, 171 F. Supp. 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
IS In Dottenheim v. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co., 77 F. Supp. 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1948), hearing
on motions to dismiss, 7 F.R.D. 195 (E.D.N.Y. 1947), plaintiff's attorney was hired on a
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in seeking clients and fees may often be the sole incentive for the
enforcement of 16(b);17 to deny fee recovery where no suit is ever

filed by one other than the corporation would be penalizing the
effective 16(b) private investigators for the efficiency of those
corporations which choose to settle or pursue 16(b) claims within
the statutory sixty-day period.'

Under present case law as

developed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, however, the recovery of counsel fees where the corporation

has settled or filed suit during the sixty-day period has been limited
by the "substantial period" test. 9 Under that test, when a
shareholder's attorney seeks to recover for a complaint drafted
during the statutory period, he will be compensated for his efforts
only where he has given the corporation notice near the end of the
two-year 16(b) statute of limitations 0 and received evasive replies
as to whether the corporation would seriously pursue recovery of
the short-swing profits.2 t Only then is the drafting of a
contingent basis to investigate possible 16(b) violations. After discovery, the attorney sent a
letter to the corporation which resulted in remedial action by defendant. The court concluded
that there was no contractual relationship between plaintiff's attorney and.the corporation on
which to base recovery of counsel fees, and also that 16(b) suits are not technically derivative
suits. However, while the court acknowledged that only a letter was sent, and that the only
benefit rendered was use of the fund for some ten months, a recovery of S1000 was permitted
to plaintiff as reasonable counsel fees.
"See note 2 supra and accompanying .text.
' Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 F.2d 469, 473 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Gilson v.
Chock Full 0' Nuts Corp., 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964); Dottenheim v. Emerson Elec. Mfg.
Co., 77 F. Supp. 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1948), hearing on motions to dismiss. 7 F.R.D. 195
(E.D.N.Y. 1947).
"See Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1968); Gilson v. Chock Full
0' Nuts Corp., 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964).
' See note I supra.
Gilson v. Chock Full 0' Nuts Corp., 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964). In Gilson the
stockholder's attorney uncovered a 16(b) violation, but because of the impending expiration
of the two year statute of limitations and negative and evasive response of the corporation to
his statutory request for action, he also prepared a complaint prior to the running of the
sixty day period. On the issue of counsel fees the court concluded that equity generally treats
a shareholder who merely discovers a claim and brings it to the attention of the company as
an informer or volunteer regardless of the time, effort or money expended. In addition, the
court alluded to policy considerations against requiring a corporation to ".

.

. pay a

stockholder for volunteeering to do what the corporation ought to do and might well have
... Id. at 109. While the court did not spell out the policy factors, it did state that
done.
they would be particularly strong in a case where the shareholder's request was made soon
after the information became available through the 16(a) reports. However. the court held
the preparation of the complaint by counsel reasonable and compensable in light of the
impending expiration of the statute of limitations.
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complaint during the sixty-day period deemed "appropriately
rendered." Similarly, where a shareholder's attorney seeks to

recover for investigation and discovery"of a 16(b) claim during the
period and where the corporation thereafter filed suit or settled, "...
[fee] recovery will be allowed only if the corporation has done

nothing for a substantial period of time after the suspect
transactions and its inaction is likely to continue.'"' 2

The "substantial period" test reflects both an attempt to
encourage effective outside enforcement of 16(b) and a desire to
allow corporations time to remedy violations from within.
Certainly, the Second Circuit recognized that without some
allowance for recovery of discovery and drafting expenses during
the sixty-day period, corporations could ignore 16(b) infractions
unless faced with a shareholder's request, and that by prosecuting

all such requests, insiders could work toward the day when no
attorney would find it profitable to investigate 16(b) violations. On

the other hand, the court realized the need for slower and betterreasoned research by both corporations' and shareholders'
attorneys, as well as the need to prevent duplication of work
product 2 3 -a

need which conceivably would be served by

encouraging corporations independently to recover 16(b) profits
long before private expenses would be incurred.Y" Analysis, however,
reveals that the "substantial period" test only partially solves the

problem of proper outsid enforcement of 16(b). As a practical
matter, it is generally recognized that corporations rarely police
22Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 F.2d 469, 473 (2d Cir. 1968). In Blau plaintiff
brought suit to recover expenses incurred by his attorney during investigation of insider
transactions. After discovery of a violation of 16(b), counsel advised the company of its
cause of action, and the profits were recovered without the need for court action. The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reiterated its statement from Gilson that it had not yet
been necessary to decide the narrow issue of counsel fees for mere discovery of a claim. In an
attempt to avoid the evils of champerty and duplication of services on the one hand and total
denial of fees in the absence of suit on the other, the court struck a middle ground. Applying
the "'substantial period" test to the facts, the court decided that as the corporation had done
nothing prior to receiving the statutory notice, and as i had already allowed the statute of
limitations to run on one other series of transactions by defendant, it was likely that the
company's inaction would continue. Thus, recovery for discovery was permitted, but
returning to Gilson for the test to be applied to the complaint drawn by plaintiff's counsel,
the court held that as there was no danger of the statute of limitations running prior to the
end of the sixty day period, the drafting of the complaint was not "appropriately rendered."
I Gilson v. Chock Full 0' Nuts Corp., 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964).
-. Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1968).
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16(b) violations,2' the corporations are often no more than alter
egos of those against whom the section is aimed. It is still up to
someone other than the corporation to insist upon enforcement.
Thus, under the "substantial period" test one probably can either
investigate as soon as the reports are released and wait more than a
year to make the statutory request with little fear of the
corporation taking action, or completely abandon the investigation
of current transactions and consult only reports of at least one
year's vintage. In effect, one who is interested in profiting from
investigating 16(a) reports can do so as easily now as before the
promulgation of the Second Circuit test. Moreover, it is unlikely
that an investigator would expend any more effort now than before
since certainty of expense recovery has been undercut by the test's
vague outline. Corporations may also suffer. Actual ability to
recover short-swing profits may have been decreased by
introduction of the "substantial period" test since procurement of
evidence and testimony and the chances of a solvent defendant are
better at the time of the violation than two years later; furthermore,
even if the corporation does recover as the result of an outsider's
efforts, it will probably be without use of the profits for an extra
two years.
Additional criticism may be lodged against the "substantial
period" test. If a 16(b) statutory request is sent the day the 16(a)
reports are available, and the corporation does nothing for sixty
days, the moving shareholder will receive full compensation for
counsel fees after a successful trial even if he files suit sixty-one
days after the reports are available. On the other hand, if the
corporation does take action, then the courts penalize the attorney
for being overzealous and deny him recovery for his services to that
time. Thus, unless the attorney delays for nearly two years the
corporation by its reaction to the statutory request could arbitrarily
control the recovery of counsel fees. Furthermore, the "substantial
period" test is hardly reflective of legislative intent. The statute
permits stockholder requests to be sent at any- time during the twoyear statute of limitations period, indicating that Congress did not
deem it advantageous to 16(b) enforcement to allow the corporation
any time during which to voluntarily act without shareholder prodding. In practice, however, this is exactly what the current case law

1 See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
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provides. It appears, therefore, that the courts should either
c6ndone the risk of champerty and duplication and admit that
delay will not significantly increase the level of inside enforcement
of 16(b) on the theory that the public interest in enforcement of
that section overrides the risks of these evils, or provide a concrete
alternative to the Second Circuit test.
A viable alternative would be statutory provision for two sixtyday periods rather than one36 During the first sixty days after a set
of 16(a) reports are available, the corporation would have the sole
power to act. No services performed during this period by a
shareholder's attorney would be compensable. Such a period would
properly place the primary burden for enforcement on the
corporation. Furthermore, the sixty-day length of this period would
appear reasonable in light of the present congressional enactment
which sets out sixty days as ample time for a corporation to act
once a shareholder's request has been presented to it. If, by the
expiration of the first period the corporation had not .brought suit
or procured a settlement, then a shareholder's attorney would be
permitted to investigate for 16(b) violations. Upon discovery of a
violatior and presentation of the statutory request, such
shareholder's attorney would be entitled to a set sum for counsel
fees. Also upon presentation of the request the second sixty-day
period would begin to run. If, after thirty days from the date of the
request the corporation still had not brought suit or procured a
settlement, the shareholder's attorney would be permitted to draft a
complaint and recover for his expenses. The thirty-day period again
would seem reasonable since 16(a) reports would have been
available for at least ninety days. Finally, if the corporation had
not brought suit within sixty days of the request, the shareholder's
attorney might do so.
Compared with the "substantial period" test, the suggested
alternative would provide superior enforcement. Generally,
enforcement would be accelerated by nearly two years under the
alternative. Although outside enforcement would be delayed sixty
" Professor Loss has suggested that the section be amende4 to provide for enforcement by
the SEC rather than the issuer or its shareholders. 2 Loss at 1053-55. However, the

commission is understandably reluctant to enter the field. Professor Cary, former chairman
of the commission, has argued that self-enforcement has been effective and is preferable to
governmental intervention. See Cary, Recent Developments in Securities Regulation. 63
COLU.

L. REv. 856 (1963).
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days longer than under the present statutory scheme, the present
case law encourages delay in most instances until shortly before the
two-year statute of limitations expires*2 Duplication would persist
under the alternative, but corporations, the parties ordinarily
pleading duplication as a reason for termination of outside
enforcement, would be given every opportunity to prevent it: there
are no less than three stages in every case where a corporation
could assume responsibility for the enforcement of 16(b) and bring
an end to further duplication. Profiteering also would be impossible
to halt completely so long as outside enforcement is necessary, but
by giving corporations several opportunities to step in without
penalizing outside attorneys for work already completed, the
external stimulus still would be encouraged, yet the corporation
would be constantly urged to enter and limit the outsider's profit.
The key to control of the unethical aspects of outside enforcement
is careful regulation of the initial fee attorneys may recover for
mere discovery before a corporation is on notice and can stop
further shareholder action. With a set initial fee the outsider would
have no opportunity to pad the bill for discovery, and the
unscrupulous would not be attracted to 16(b) enforcement.
Unfortunately, however, there seems to be no way to guarantee
slower and better-reasoned research by any attorney. Still the 120day period would remove the speed factor from 16(b) enforcement
while not causing serious delay. Finally, and perhaps most
important, the standards of the alternative are concrete. It would,
if enacted, inject some certainty into the law, putting both the
shareholder and the corporation on notice as to how each might
satisfy the statutory requirements.
.- See note 20 supra and accompanying text.

